Le mythe Oussama Ben Laden

Par Paul Craig Roberts

1. 1Publié le : mercredi 12 décembre
   

L’interview d’Oussama ben Laden reproduite ci-dessous a été réalisée par le quotidien pakistanais Ummat et publiée le 28 septembre 2001, 17 jours après les attentats du 11 septembre contre le World Trade Center et le Pentagone attribués, sans réel fondement, à al-Qaïda. Cette interview est vraiment étonnante. En effet, le soi-disant cerveau du 11-Septembre a déclaré que ni lui, ni al-Qaïda n’avait quoi que ce soit à voir avec ces attentats.

Cette interview a été traduite en anglais par le service international de la BBC et rendue publique le 29 septembre 2001.

Ce démenti sensationnel d’Oussama ben Laden n’a été repris par aucun média américain. Il n’a fait l’objet d’aucune enquête de la part du pouvoir exécutif. Aucun membre du Congrès n’a évoqué le déni de responsabilité de ben Laden pour ce qui apparaissait comme la plus grande humiliation jamais infligée à une superpuissance.

Pour vérifier cette absence de couverture médiatique, j’ai recherché « interview d’Oussama ben Laden rejetant toute responsabilité dans les attentats du 11 septembre » sur Google. Quelques sites internet reproduisaient cet entretien mais la seule source d’information grand public que j’ai pu trouver était une vidéo d’une minute émanant de CNN, postée sur YouTube, et dans laquelle le présentateur, après avoir cité un reportage de Al Jazeera sur les dénégations de ben Laden, concluait que « chacun de nous est en mesure d’évaluer la crédibilité de ces déclarations et d’en tirer ses propres conclusions ». En d’autres termes, ben Laden avait déjà été diabolisé et ses dénégations n’étaient pas crédibles.

Manifestement, cette information sensationnelle n’était pas « appropriée » pour les citoyens américains et leur fut cachée par la « presse libre », une presse libre de mentir pour le gouvernement mais pas de dire la vérité.

Il est vrai que si ben Laden avait réussi à berner non seulement la NSA, la CIA, la DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) et le FBI, mais aussi les 16 agences de renseignement américaines, toutes les agences de renseignement des États vassaux de l’OTAN, le Mossad et également le Conseil national de sécurité, le NORAD, le contrôle aérien américain et la sécurité aéroportuaire quatre fois de suite dans la même matinée, cela constituerait la plus grande prouesse de tous les temps, un exploit qui aurait fait d’al-Qaïda l’organisation anti-impérialiste la plus efficace de toute l’histoire de l’humanité, une victoire extraordinaire contre le « Grand Satan » qui aurait attiré des millions de nouvelles recrues dans les rangs d’al-Qaïda. Mais le soi-disant « cerveau » a nié toute responsabilité.

Je me souviens d’un attentat terroriste survenu il y a plusieurs décennies en Europe – je ne sais pas si c’était un attentat réel ou un « attentat sous fausse bannière » de type « Opération Gladio » – et qui avait été revendiqué par d’innombrables organisations. Peut-être que la CIA avait utilisé ce moyen pour faire diversion, mais cela démontre néanmoins que tous les services de renseignement sont conscients de l’importance que représente la revendication d’un attentat réussi pour une organisation terroriste. Bien que ben Laden ait rejeté toute responsabilité, plusieurs leaders d’al-Qaïda, réalisant le prestige qu’ils pouvaient retirer des attentats du 11-Septembre, revendiquèrent ces attaques en 2011 et critiquèrent le président iranien Ahmadinejad pour les doutes qu’il émettait sur la version officielle.

Bien que peu d’Américains aient connaissance de cet entretien du 28/11/2001 au cours duquel ben Laden déclare qu’il n’est pas impliqué dans les attentats du 11-Septembre, beaucoup d’entre eux ont vu des vidéos produites après 2001 et dans lesquelles une personne censée être ben Laden revendique ces attentats. Il y a deux problèmes avec ces vidéos. D’une part, les experts qui les ont examinées ont conclu qu’elles étaient truquées et d’autre part, toutes ces vidéos sont apparues après que ben Laden ait été déclaré mort, mi-décembre 2001, des suites d’une maladie pulmonaire par le Pakistan Observer (Ndt : quotidien pakistanais), la presse égyptienne et Fox News.

Ben Laden était également malade des reins. Dans un reportage du 28/01/2002, CBS News indiquait que ben Laden était en dialyse à l’hôpital militaire pakistanais de Rawalpindi le 10/09/2001, la veille des attentats.

Il semble évident qu’un homme souffrant de graves maladies pulmonaires et rénales n’a pas pu survivre 10 ans de plus pour finir assassiné par un commando de Navy Seal à Abbottabad. Un entretien de la TV pakistanaise avec le voisin de la prétendue « maison fortifiée de ben Laden » a d’ailleurs révélé que cette opération était un canular. Mais là encore, aucun organe de la « presse libre » américaine n’a repris cette sensationnelle interview. J’ai fait traduire cet entretien. Voir ici et ici.

Peu de temps après ce prétendu assassinat, 30 membres du commando de Navy Seal [qui était intervenu à Abbottabad] sont morts dans un mystérieux accident d’hélicoptère en Afghanistan. En outre, on a appris que pas un seul des milliers de marins embarqués sur le porte-avions USS Carl Vinson n’a été témoin de la prétendue inhumation en mer de ben Laden. La presse rapporte, sans sourciller, que pour des raisons inconnues, cette inhumation s’est déroulée à l’abri du regard des hommes d’équipage. Ceci est censé être la raison pour laquelle les e-mails des marins à leur famille et à leurs amis ne faisaient état d’aucune inhumation en mer. Certains se demandent même si les Navy Seal n’ont pas été liquidés avant que leurs questions du genre « Tu faisais partie du raid ? » ne filtrent en dehors du commando. Apparemment, ni les médias ni le public n’ont trouvé étrange que le gouvernement américain capture et tue le cerveau du terrorisme sans l’interroger et sans conserver aucune preuve ou présenter un seul témoin qui confirme cet assassinat.

En son temps, Adolf Hitler a déclaré que les communistes avaient incendié le Reichstag et que les troupes polonaises avaient franchi la frontière et attaqué l’Allemagne. Avec le 11-Septembre, les américains ont découvert la « version Washington » de ces grands mensonges historiques. Un ben Laden omniscient sur le point de mourir au fin fond de l’Afghanistan a mis en échec la sécurité nationale des États-Unis et a conduit son attaque jusque dans les murs du Pentagone nécessitant, pour notre défense, le déclenchement d’une « guerre au terrorisme » qui a détruit les libertés civiles américaines et ruiné le pays juste pour éviter le triomphe d’un homme mort de cause naturelle en décembre 2001.

Le 9 mai 2011, le professeur Michel Chossudovsky a republié l’interview d’Oussama ben Laden du 28 septembre 2001 dans Global Research.

Paul Craig Roberts

Article original en anglais : « The Osama bin Laden Myth », publié le 27 novembre 2012.

La traduction française de l’entrevue : « INTERVIEW D’OUSSAMA BEN LADEN du 28 septembre 2001. Oussama Ben Laden nie toute participation dans les événements du 11/9 »

Entretien avec Oussama ben Laden

Oussama Ben Laden nie son implication dans les attentats du 11-Septembre

Source : Global Research, 9 mai 2011

Note de la rédaction de Global Research

Nous apportons à l’attention des lecteurs le texte d’une interview d’Oussama Ben Laden publié dans le quotidien pakistanais Ummat de Karachi le 28 septembre 2001. Il a été traduit en anglais par la BBC World Monitoring Service et communiqué le 29 septembre 2001.

L’authenticité de cette interview, qui est disponible dans les archives électroniques, est confirmée.

Oussama Ben Laden nie catégoriquement un quelconque rôle dans les attentats du 11-Septembre.

Dans cette interview, les déclarations de Ben Laden se distinguent nettement de celles des différentes vidéos qui lui sont attribuées.

Oussama Ben Laden s’exprime sur les pertes humaines lors du 11-Septembre. Il fait aussi des déclarations sur l’identité du (des) auteur(s) probable(s) des attaques du 11-Septembre, selon lui.

C’est un texte important qui n’a jamais été porté à l’attention de l’opinion publique occidentale.

Les passages clés de cette interview ont été mis en gras.

Espérons que le texte de cette interview, publié à peine une semaine avant le début de la guerre en l’Afghanistan, contribuera à une meilleure compréhension de l’histoire d’al-Qaïda, du rôle d’Oussama Ben Laden et des événements tragiques du 11 septembre 2001.

Michel Chossudovsky, le 9 mai 2011

Texte intégral de l’entretien exclusif entre le journal pakistanais Ummat et Oussama ben Laden réalisé à Karachi le 28 septembre 2001

Introduction d’Ummat

KABOUL : Le fameux combattant moudjahidine arabe de la guerre sainte, Oussama ben Laden, affirme que lui ou son groupe al-Qaida n’ont rien à voir avec les attaques suicides du 11-Septembre à Washington et à New York. Il dit que le gouvernement étatsunien devrait rechercher les responsables des attentats à l’intérieur des États-Unis. Dans son entretien exclusif avec Ummat, il avance que ces attaques pourraient être l’acte de ceux qui font partie du système étatsunien et qui se rebellent contre celui-ci en travaillant pour un autre. Ou bien que cela pourrait être le fait de ceux qui veulent faire du siècle présent, celui du conflit entre l’Islam et le Christianisme. Ou bien encore, que les juifs étatsuniens, opposés au Président Bush depuis les élections de Floride, pourraient être les cerveaux de cette opération. Il y a aussi une forte possibilité de l’implication des agences de renseignements étatsuniennes, dont les budgets se montent à plusieurs milliards de dollars chaque année. Il déclare qu’il y a un gouvernement à l’intérieur du gouvernement aux États-Unis.

On devrait demander aux services secrets, qui sont derrière ces attaques, dit-il. Oussama indique que le soutien d’une attaque contre l’Afghanistan était nécessaire pour certains pays musulmans et contraint pour d’autres. Cependant, il dit être reconnaissant envers les courageux Pakistanais d’avoir érigé un rempart contre les forces infidèles. Il a ajouté que le monde islamique attendait beaucoup du Pakistan et qu’en temps de besoin, « nous défendrons ce rempart en sacrifiant des vies ».

Interview intégrale

Ummat : On vous accuse d’être impliqué dans les attaques à New York et à Washington. Qu’avez-vous à dire ? Si ce n’est pas vous, qui pourrait l’être ?

OBL [Oussama Ben Laden] : Au nom d’Allah, le bienveillant, le plus charitable. Loué soit Allah, créateur de l’univers qui a fait de la terre une demeure de paix pour l’humanité entière. Allah l’Éternel, qui a envoyé le Prophète Mahomet pour nous guider.

Je remercie les publications Ummat de me donner l’opportunité d’exprimer mon point de vue aux peuples et particulièrement aux valeureux Momins (les purs et vertueux fidèles musulmans – ndt) du Pakistan qui refusent de croire au mensonge du démon.

J’ai déjà dit que je ne suis pas impliqué dans les attaques du 11-Septembre aux États-Unis. Comme tout musulman, je fais de mon mieux pour ne pas dire de mensonges. Je n’avais aucune connaissance de ces attaques, et je ne considère pas le meurtre de femmes, d’enfants et de personnes innocentes comme un acte appréciable. L’islam interdit strictement de faire du mal aux femmes, enfants et aux personnes en général.

Une telle pratique est de surcroît prohibée lors d’une bataille. Ce sont les États-Unis qui maltraitent femmes, enfants et les personnes d’autres croyances, en particulier les disciples de l’islam. Tout ce qui se passe en Palestine depuis les 11 derniers mois suffit à appeler la colère de Dieu sur les États-Unis et Israël.

C’est un avertissement aux pays musulmans qui ont été témoins de tout cela comme des spectateurs silencieux. Qu’est-ce qui a récemment été fait aux peuples innocents d’Irak, de Tchétchénie et de Bosnie ?

Une seule conclusion qui peut être tirée de l’indifférence des États-Unis et de l’Occident envers ces actes de terrorisme et le soutien des tyrans qui les commettent : l’Amérique est une puissance anti-islamique et traite les forces anti-islamiques avec condescendance. Son amitié avec les pays musulmans est juste un spectacle, une supercherie. En dévoyant ou en intimidant ces pays, les États-Unis les forcent à suivre leurs propres intérêts. Jetez un coup d’œil autour de vous et vous verrez que les esclaves des États-Unis sont soit les autocrates, soit les ennemis des musulmans.

Les États-Unis n’ont aucun ami, pas plus qu’ils ne veulent traiter d’égal à égal, car le préalable de l’amitié est de se mettre à son niveau et de le considérer son égal. L’Amérique ne désire pas l’égalité. Elle demande la soumission des autres. Donc, les autres pays sont ses esclaves ou bien ses vassaux.

Cependant, notre cas est différent. Nous avons juré de servir seulement notre Dieu l’Omnipotent et après fait ce vœu, il est impossible de devenir l’esclave de quelqu’un d’autre. Si nous le faisions, cela serait irrespectueux envers notre Dieu Éternel et les autres êtres célestes. La plupart des pays qui préservent leur liberté sont des pays religieux et ennemis des États-Unis, ou bien ces derniers les considèrent comme leurs ennemis. Or les pays qui n’acceptent pas de devenir esclaves, comme la Chine, l’Iran, la Libye, Cuba, la Syrie et l’ancienne Russie sont tournés sur eux-mêmes.

Ceux qui ont commis les actes du 11-Septembre ne sont pas les amis du peuple étatsunien. J’ai déjà dit que nous sommes contre le système étatsunien, pas contre son peuple, alors que dans ces attaques c’est le peuple des États-Unis qui a été tué.

Selon mes informations, le bilan des victimes est bien plus lourd que ce qu’a déclaré le gouvernement. Mais l’administration Bush ne veut pas créer la panique. Les États-Unis devraient essayer de localiser les auteurs de ces attaques chez eux ; parmi ceux qui font partie du système étatsunien, mais qui le contestent. Ou parmi ceux qui œuvrent pour un autre système ; parmi les individus qui veulent faire de ce siècle celui du conflit entre l’islam et le christianisme, afin que leur propre civilisation, nation, pays, ou idéologie puissent survivre. Cela peut être n’importe qui, de la Russie à Israël, de l’Inde à la Serbie. Aux États-Unis même, il y a des douzaines de groupes bien organisés et bien équipés, capables de provoquer des destructions sur une grande échelle. Et puis il ne faut pas oublier les juifs étatsuniens, exaspérés par le président Bush depuis le résultat des élections en Floride et qui veulent le punir.

Ensuite il y a les agences de renseignements des États-Unis, dont les budgets dépendent des milliards de dollars décidés chaque année par le Congrès et le gouvernement. La question du financement n’était pas un problème majeur lors de l’existence de l’ex-Union soviétique, mais après cela le budget de ces agences a été mis en péril.

Ils avaient besoin d’un ennemi. Ainsi, ils ont d’abord commencé la propagande contre Oussama et les Taliban, et puis cet incident est arrivé. Résultat, l’administration Bush a approuvé un budget de 40 milliards de dollars. Où ira cette énorme manne ? Elle sera fournie à ces mêmes agences qui ont besoin d’énormément d’argent pour exercer leur influence.

Elles vont maintenant dépenser l’argent pour leur expansion et augmenter leur influence. Je vous donne un exemple. Les trafiquants de drogue à travers le monde sont en contact avec les services secrets étatsuniens. Ces agences ne veulent pas éradiquer la culture de la drogue et son trafic parce que leur importance en serait diminuée. Le personnel du DEA (les “stups” étatsuniens – Ndt) encourage le commerce des stupéfiants afin de faire valoir ses performances et [continuer de] recevoir des millions de dollars de budget. La CIA a fait du général Noriega un baron de la drogue, puis dans le besoin en a fait un bouc émissaire. De la même façon, que ce soit le Président Bush ou les autres présidents, ils ne peuvent traduire Israël en justice pour ses atteintes aux Droits de l’homme ou le tenir responsable de tels crimes. Pourquoi cela ? N’y a-t-il pas un gouvernement dans le gouvernement aux États-Unis ? On devrait demander à ce gouvernement secret qui a commis ces attaques.

Ummat : Un certain nombre de pays ont répondu à l’appel des États-Unis pour lancer une attaque contre l’Afghanistan. Ceux-ci incluent aussi un certain nombre de pays musulmans. Est-ce qu’al-Qaïda va déclarer le jihad contre ces pays aussi ?

OBL : Je dois dire que mon devoir est juste de réveiller les musulmans ; leur dire ce qui est bon pour eux et ce qui ne l’est pas. Que dit l’islam et que veulent les ennemis de l’islam ?

Al-Qaïda a été créée pour mener le jihad contre l’infidélité (sic), particulièrement pour contrer l’assaut des pays infidèles envers les états islamiques. Le jihad est le sixième pilier non déclaré de l’islam. Les cinq premiers étant les fondements sacrés de l’islam : les prières, le jeûne, le pèlerinage à La Mecque et l’aumône. Tous les opposants de l’islam en ont peur. Al-Qaïda veut maintenir cet élément vivant et actif et en faire une partie de la vie quotidienne des musulmans. Il veut lui donner le statut de vénération. Nous ne sommes contre aucun pays islamique ni ne considérons une guerre contre un pays islamique comme jihad.

Nous sommes en faveur du jihad armé seulement contre ces pays infidèles, qui tuent des innocents, des femmes et des enfants, juste parce qu’ils sont musulmans. Supporter les États-Unis est une nécessité pour certains pays musulmans et une contrainte pour d’autres.

Cependant, ils devraient songer à ce qui reste de leur réputation religieuse et morale s’ils soutiennent l’attaque des chrétiens et des juifs sur un pays musulman comme l’Afghanistan. Les ordres de jurisprudence de la Shari’a islamique pour de tels individus, organisations et pays sont clairs et tous les érudits de la communauté musulmane sont unanimes à leur propos. Nous ferons de même ce qu’ordonnera le Vertueux Émir commandant des fidèles le mullah Omar et les érudits islamiques. Les cœurs des peuples des pays musulmans battent à l’appel du jihad. Nous leur sommes reconnaissants.

Ummat : Les pertes occasionnées par les attaques à New York et à Washington ont prouvé que de frapper les intérêts économiques des États-Unis n’est pas trop difficile. Les experts étatsuniens reconnaissent que de telles attaques supplémentaires peuvent faire effondrer l’économie américaine. Pourquoi al-Qaïda ne cible-t-elle pas ses fondements économiques ?

OBL : J’ai déjà dit que nous ne sommes pas hostiles aux États-Unis. Nous sommes contre le système qui fait des nations les esclaves des États-Unis, ou les force à hypothéquer leur liberté politique et économique. Ce système est complètement sous contrôle des juifs étatsuniens, dont la première priorité est Israël, pas les États-Unis. Les étatsuniens sont carrément les esclaves des juifs et sont forcés de vivre selon leurs lois et leurs principes. En conséquence, Israël devrait être puni. En fait, c’est Israël qui ensanglante les innocents musulmans alors que les États-Unis ne disent rien.

Ummat : À part la lutte armée, n’y a-t-il pas d’autres moyens de nuire aux ennemis de l’islam ? Par exemple, en incitant les musulmans à boycotter les produits occidentaux, banques, lignes de transport maritime, chaines de télévision…

OBL : Primo, les produits occidentaux pourront seulement être boycottés quand la fraternité musulmane sera complètement réveillée et organisée. Secondo, les firmes musulmanes doivent devenir indépendantes en produisant des marchandises égales aux produits occidentaux. Le boycott économique de l’Occident n’est pas possible à moins que l’indépendance économique ne soit atteinte et que des produits de substitution voient le jour. La richesse est clairsemée à travers le monde islamique et il n’existe aucune chaîne de télévision pour prêcher les commandements islamiques selon les exigences de la vie moderne et atteindre une influence internationale. Les marchands musulmans et mécènes devraient juger de l’importance de l’utilisation de l’arme de l’opinion publique et de son contrôle. Le monde d’aujourd’hui est fait par l’opinion publique et le destin des nations est déterminé par la pression de celle-ci. Dès que vous obtenez les moyens de façonner l’opinion publique, tout ce que vous désirez devient possible.

Ummat : Toute la propagande de votre lutte a pour l’instant été véhiculée par les médias occidentaux. Mais aucune information n’est reçue de sources de votre réseau al-Qaïda ainsi que ses succès du jihad. Quelles sont vos remarques ?

OBL : En fait, les médias occidentaux n’ont plus grand-chose d’autre. Depuis longtemps, ils n’ont plus aucun autre thème pour survivre. Alors que nous, avons beaucoup d’autres choses à faire. La lutte du jihad et ses succès est pour la gloire d’Allah, pas pour agacer ses serviteurs. Notre silence est notre vraie propagande. Les refus, explications ou erratas sont des pertes de temps, et à travers cela l’ennemi veut vous conduire dans des choses qui vous sont inutiles. Cela vous éloigne de votre cause.

Les médias occidentaux assènent une propagande injustifiée, surprenante, mais révélatrice de leur état d’esprit et progressivement ils deviennent prisonniers de cette propagande. Ils en prennent peur puis s’infligent des préjudices. La terreur est l’arme la plus redoutable des temps modernes et les médias occidentaux l’utilisent impitoyablement contre leur propre population. Cela augmente la peur et l’impuissance dans les esprits des Européens et des Étatsuniens. Cela indique que ce que les ennemis des États-Unis ne peuvent pas faire, ses médias le font. On peut comprendre ce que serait l’efficacité d’une nation en guerre, en proie à la peur et l’impuissance.

Ummat : Quel sera l’impact du gel des avoirs d’al-Qaïda par les États-Unis ?

OBL : Dieu ouvre des voies pour ceux qui travaillent pour Lui. Geler des avoirs ne changera rien pour al-Qaïda ou les autres groupes jihadistes. Par la grâce d’Allah, al-Qaïda a plus de trois systèmes financiers alternatifs, qui sont tous séparés et complètement indépendants les uns des autres. Ce système fonctionne par le soutien de ceux consacrés au jihad. Pas plus que les États-Unis, le monde même unifié ne peut infléchir ces personnes de leur voie.

Ces individus ne se comptent pas par centaines, mais par milliers et millions. Al-Qaida a dans ses rangs des jeunes gens éduqués et modernes aussi bien conscients des failles du système financier occidental que des lignes de leurs mains. Celles-ci sont les imperfections du système fiscal occidental, tel un nœud coulant autour de ce système qui ne pourra pas se ressaisir malgré le passage de nombreux jours.

Ummat : À part l’Afghanistan, y a-t-il d’autres zones sûres d’où vous pouvez continuer le jihad ?

OBL : Il y a des endroits partout dans le monde où de solides forces jihadistes sont présentes, de l’Indonésie à l’Algérie, de Kaboul à la Tchétchénie, de la Bosnie au Soudan et de la Birmanie au Cachemire. Ce n’est donc pas le problème de ma personne. Je ne suis qu’un misérable serviteur de Dieu, constamment dans la peur de rendre des comptes à Dieu. Ce n’est pas la question d’Oussama, mais de l’islam et du jihad. Grâce à Dieu, ceux qui poursuivent le jihad peuvent aujourd’hui marcher la tête haute. Le jihad existait déjà lorsqu’il n’y avait pas d’Oussama et il subsistera encore lorsqu’Oussama ne sera plus là. Allah ouvre des voies et remplit les cœurs d’affection de ceux qui marchent sur le sentier d’Allah avec leurs vies, possessions et enfants. Croyez bien qu’à travers le jihad, un homme reçoit tout ce qu’il désire. Et la plus grande aspiration pour un musulman est l’après vie. Le martyre est la façon la plus courte pour atteindre la vie éternelle.

Ummat : Que pouvez-vous dire de la position du gouvernement pakistanais concernant l’attaque de l’Afghanistan ?

OBL : Nous sommes reconnaissants aux Momins et au valeureux peuple du Pakistan qui a érigé un rempart contre les forces mauvaises en se tenant fermement en première ligne de la bataille. Le Pakistan est une grande inspiration pour la fraternité islamique. Son peuple est réveillé, organisé et riche en foi spirituelle.

Ils ont soutenu l’Afghanistan dans sa guerre contre l’Union soviétique et ont offert toute l’aide nécessaire aux moudjahidines et au peuple afghan. Ceux-là mêmes qui épaulent les taliban. Si ces individus apparaissent seulement dans deux pays, la domination occidentale diminuera en quelques jours. Nos cœurs battent pour le Pakistan, et grâce à Dieu, en cas de période difficile nous le protégerons avec notre sang. Le Pakistan est pour nous comme un lieu de culte sacré. Nous sommes le peuple du jihad et la lutte pour la défense du Pakistan est pour nous le suprême des jihad. Il nous importe peu qui gouverne le Pakistan. Le plus important est que l’esprit du jihad soit vivant et résolument fort dans les cœurs des Pakistanais.

Copyright Ummat, traduction de l’urdu en anglais par la BBC, 2001. Traduction en français de cette interview par Paul Vetran pour ReOpenNews.

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In a 2004 BBC article entitled "Al-Qaeda's origins and links", the BBC wrote:

During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA.[1]

Robin Cook, Foreign Secretary in the UK from 1997–2001, and Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the Council from 2001–2003, believed the CIA had provided arms to the Arab Mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, writing, "Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan."[2]

In conversation with former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto said Osama bin Laden was initially pro-American.[3] Prince Bandar bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, has also stated that bin Laden appreciated the United States' help in Afghanistan. On CNN's Larry King program he said:[4]

Bandar bin Sultan: This is ironic. In the mid-'80s, if you remember, we and the United - Saudi Arabia and the United States were supporting the Mujahideen to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviets. He [Osama bin Laden] came to thank me for my efforts to bring the Americans, our friends, to help us against the atheists, he said the communists. Isn't it ironic?

Larry King: How ironic. In other words, he came to thank you for helping bring America to help him.

Bandar bin Sultan: Right.

U.S. government officials and a number of other parties maintain that the U.S. supported only the indigenous Afghan mujahideen. They deny that the CIA or other American officials had contact with the Afghan Arabs (foreign mujahideen) or Bin Laden, let alone armed, trained, coached or indoctrinated them. Scholars and reporters have called the idea of CIA-backed Afghan Arabs (foreign mujahideen) "nonsense",[5] "sheer fantasy",[6] and "simply a folk myth."[7]

from Wikipedia

______________________________________________

By Michael Moran
August 24, 1998
MSNBC

BRAVE NEW WORLD

NEW YORK, Aug. 24, 1998 -- At the CIA, it happens often enough to have a code name: Blowback. Simply defined, this is the term describing an agent, an operative or an operation that has turned on its creators. Osama bin Laden, our new public enemy Number 1, is the personification of blowback. And the fact that he is viewed as a hero by millions in the Islamic world proves again the old adage: Reap what you sow.

Befpre up [sic] click on my face and call me naive, let me concede some points. Yes, the West needed Josef Stalin to defeat Hitler. Yes, there were times during the Cold War when supporting one villain (Cambodia's Lon Nol, for instance) would have been better than the alternative (Pol Pot). So yes, there are times when any nation must hold its nose and shake hands with the devil for the long-term good of the planet.

But just as surely, there are times when the United States, faced with such moral dilemmas, should have resisted the temptation to act. Arming a multi-national coalition of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan during the 1980s - well after the destruction of the Marine barracks in Beirut or the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 - was one of those times.

BIN LADEN'S BEGINNINGS

As anyone who has bothered to read this far certainly knows by now, bin Laden is the heir to Saudi construction fortune who, at least since the early 1990s, has used that money to finance countless attacks on U.S. interests and those of its Arab allies around the world.

As his unclassified CIA biography states, bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan after Moscow's invasion in 1979. By 1984, he was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar - the MAK - which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war.

What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan's state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA's primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow's occupation.

By no means was Osama bin Laden the leader of Afghanistan's mujahedeen. His money gave him undue prominence in the Afghan struggle, but the vast majority of those who fought and died for Afghanistan's freedom - like the Taliban regime that now holds sway over most of that tortured nation - were Afghan nationals.

Yet the CIA, concerned about the factionalism of Afghanistan made famous by Rudyard Kipling, found that Arab zealots who flocked to aid the Afghans were easier to "read" than the rivalry-ridden natives. While the Arab volunteers might well prove troublesome later, the agency reasoned, they at least were one-dimensionally anti-Soviet for now. So bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the "reliable" partners of the CIA in its war against Moscow.

WHAT'S 'INTELLIGENT' ABOUT THIS?

Though he has come to represent all that went wrong with the CIA's reckless strategy there, by the end of the Afghan war in 1989, bin Laden was still viewed by the agency as something of a dilettante - a rich Saudi boy gone to war and welcomed home by the Saudi monarchy he so hated as something of a hero.

In fact, while he returned to his family's construction business, bin Laden had split from the relatively conventional MAK in 1988 and established a new group, al-Qaida, that included many of the more extreme MAK members he had met in Afghanistan.

Most of these Afghan vets, or Afghanis, as the Arabs who fought there became known, turned up later behind violent Islamic movements around the world. Among them: the GIA in Algeria, thought responsible for the massacres of tens of thousands of civilians; Egypt's Gamat Ismalia, which has massacred western tourists repeatedly in recent years; Saudi Arabia Shiite militants, responsible for the Khobar Towers and Riyadh bombings of 1996.

Indeed, to this day, those involved in the decision to give the Afghan rebels access to a fortune in covert funding and top-level combat weaponry continue to defend that move in the context of the Cold War. Sen. Orrin Hatch, a senior Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee making those decisions, told my colleague Robert Windrem that he would make the same call again today even knowing what bin Laden would do subsequently. "It was worth it," he said.

"Those were very important, pivotal matters that played an important role in the downfall of the Soviet Union," he said.

HINDSIGHT OR TUNNEL VISION

It should be pointed out that the evidence of bin Laden's connection to these activities is mostly classified, though its hard to imagine the CIA rushing to take credit for a Frankenstein's monster like this.

It is also worth acknowledging that it is easier now to oppose the CIA's Afghan adventures than it was when Hatch and company made them in the mid-1980s. After all, in 1998 we now know that far larger elements than Afghanistan were corroding the communist party's grip on power in Moscow.

Even Hatch can't be blamed completely. The CIA, ever mindful of the need to justify its "mission," had conclusive evidence by the mid-1980s of the deepening crisis of infrastructure within the Soviet Union. The CIA, as its deputy director Robert Gates acknowledged under congressional questioning in 1992, had decided to keep that evidence from President Reagan and his top advisors and instead continued to grossly exaggerate Soviet military and technological capabilities in its annual "Soviet Military Power" report right up to 1990.

Given that context, a decision was made to provide America's potential enemies with the arms, money - and most importantly - the knowledge of how to run a war of attrition violent and well-organized enough to humble a superpower.

That decision is coming home to roost.k

International Editor Michael Moran writes a weekly column on foreign affairs.

Copyright MSNBC 1998

_______________________________________________________________________

da ‘911 Timeline’

Shortly After November 20, 1979: Bin Laden Brother Arrested over Medina Mosque Siege, Osama Also Possibly Arrested

  

Juhayman al-Otaibi. [Source: Public domain]

One or two of the bin Laden brothers are arrested over the attempted takeover of the Grand Mosque in Medina. One of the brothers is Mahrous, the other is, according to author Steve Coll, “probably Osama.”
Inside Job? - The mosque had been seized by about five hundred rebels opposed to the Saudi royal family, led by a militant named Juhayman al-Otaibi. The rebels had apparently used Bin Laden company vehicles to stock ammunition and food in the mosque prior to its seizure, indicating some people at the company were sympathetic to them. According to one account, the two brothers are not held for long; a bin Laden company employee will say the arrest is a mistake as the arresting policemen wrongly think the two brothers are conspirators just because they are monitoring police radio traffic. [Coll, 2008, pp. 225-228]
Mahrous bin Laden - Other accounts say that Mahrous, who joined a rebel group opposed to the Saudi government in the 1960s, is held for longer and only eventually released from prison because of the close ties between the bin Ladens and the Saudi royal family. Mahrous will abandon the rebel cause and join the family business, eventually being made a head of the Medina branch and a member of the board. He will still hold these positions on 9/11, although a newspaper will report that “his past [is] not forgiven and most important decisions in the [bin Laden family business] are made without Mahrous’ input.” [Sunday Herald (Glasgow), 10/7/2001; New Yorker, 11/5/2001; Ha'aretz, 12/18/2002]
Later Comment by Osama - Osama’s position on the seizure of the mosque at this time is not known, although he will later criticize the Saudi king for not negotiating a surrender. Coll will suggest that, although he is one of the most devout members of the bin Laden family at this time, he is not in league with the rebels as he is more concerned with his own material wellbeing. [Coll, 2008, pp. 229]
Older Bin Ladens Assist Besiegers - In contrast to Osama, several other family members, including Salem, Mustafa, Yahya, and Yeslam, work extremely hard to take back the mosque. As the bin Ladens actually renovated the mosque, they are able to provide the Saudi government with detailed plans to help their assault. After the rebels retreat underground, the family brings in equipment to drill holes in the floor, so that government troops can drop grenades down on holdouts. [Coll, 2008, pp. 225-226]

1980-1989: CIA and British Train Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and Help Arm Bin Laden

  

Fearing a diplomatic incident, CIA and other US agents rarely venture into Afghanistan. Generally speaking, soldiers from the British elite Special Air Service (SAS) work with and train the mujaheddin instead. The SAS provides weapons training in Afghanistan until 1982 when Russian soldiers find the passports of two British instructors in a training camp. After that, mujaheddin are trained in secret camps in remote parts of Scotland. When the US decides to supply Stinger missiles to the mujaheddin in 1986, it is the SAS who provide the training in how to use them (see September 1986). But the SAS is taking orders from the CIA. The CIA also indirectly gives weapons to Osama bin Laden and other mujaheddin leaders. One former US intelligence official will say in 1999, “[US agents] armed [bin Laden’s] men by letting him pay rock-bottom prices for basic weapons.” But this person notes the relationship will later prove to be embarrassing to bin Laden and the CIA. “Of course it’s not something they want to talk about.” [Reeve, 1999, pp. 168]

Early 1980: Osama Bin Laden, with Saudi Backing, Supports Afghan Rebels

  

Bin Laden, dressed in combat fatigues, in Afghanistan during the 1980’s. (Note the image has been digitally altered to brighten the shadow on his face.) [Source: CNN]

Osama bin Laden begins providing financial, organizational, and engineering aid for the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, with the advice and support of the Saudi royal family. [New Yorker, 11/5/2001] Some, including Richard Clarke, counterterrorism “tsar” during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, believe he was handpicked for the job by Prince Turki al-Faisal, head of Saudi intelligence (see Early 1980 and After). [New Yorker, 11/5/2001; Sunday Times (London), 8/25/2002] The Pakistani ISI want a Saudi prince as a public demonstration of the commitment of the Saudi royal family and as a way to ensure royal funds for the anti-Soviet forces. The agency fails to get royalty, but bin Laden, with his family’s influential ties, is good enough for the ISI. [Miami Herald, 9/24/2001] (Clarke will argue later that the Saudis and other Muslim governments used the Afghan war in an attempt to get rid of their own misfits and troublemakers.) This multinational force later coalesces into al-Qaeda. [Clarke, 2004, pp. 52]

Early 1980 and After: Bin Laden Serves as Middleman between Saudi Intelligence and Afghan Warlords

  

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. [Source: BBC]

As Osama bin Laden gets involved with the mujaheddin resistance in Afghanistan, he also develops close ties to the Saudi intelligence agency, the GIP. Some believe that Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al-Faisal plays a middleman role between Saudi intelligence and mujaheddin groups (see Early 1980). Turki’s chief of staff is Ahmed Badeeb, and Badeeb had been one of bin Laden’s teachers when bin Laden was in high school. Badeeb will later say, “I loved Osama and considered him a good citizen of Saudi Arabia.” Journalist Steve Coll will later comment that while the Saudi government denies bin Laden is ever a Saudi intelligence agent, and the exact nature of his connections with the GIP remains murky, “it seems clear that bin Laden did have a substantial relationship with Saudi intelligence.” [Coll, 2004, pp. 72, 86-87] The GIP’s favorite Afghan warlord is Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the Pakistani ISI’s favorite warlord. Bin Laden quickly becomes close to both Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, even though the two warlords are not allies with each other. [Dreyfuss, 2005, pp. 268] Some CIA officers will later say that bin Laden serves as a semi-official liaison between the GIP and warlords like Sayyaf. Bin Laden meets regularly with Prince Turki and Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif. Badeeb will later say bin Laden developed “strong relations with the Saudi intelligence and with our embassy in Pakistan.… We were happy with him. He was our man. He was doing all what we ask him.” Bin Laden also develops good relations with the ISI. [Coll, 2004, pp. 72, 87-88] Bin Laden will begin clashing with the Saudi government in the early 1990s (see August 2, 1990-March 1991).

1981: Bin Laden Visits Chicago to Recruit American-Trained Engineers, Meets Yassin Kadi

  

Yassin Kadi, a Saudi working for a Chicago architectural firm, will say in 2008 that he first met Osama bin Laden in Chicago in 1981. He will further state that the purpose of bin Laden’s visit is to recruit American-trained engineers for his family’s construction business. Kadi says that he puts bin Laden in touch with a group of engineers, several of whom are eventually hired. [New York Times, 12/12/2008]

1984: Bin Laden and Other Mujaheddin Leaders Meet Mysterious Europeans in Pakistan

  

Osama bin Laden, his mentor Abdullah Azzam, and Afghan warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf meet two unnamed men in Peshawar, Pakistan. The two men are “supposed to be from somewhere in Europe” and cannot speak Arabic. As a result, Essam al Ridi, an Egyptian who has lived in the US, attends the meeting as a translator. Al Ridi will later say that the two men speak English “with an accent” and that he was invited to the meeting to translate between the men on the one hand and Sayyaf and Azzam on the other, indicating that bin Laden did not need a translator and could speak English. This is the first of several meetings between bin Laden and al Ridi, who purchases equipment for anti-Soviet fighters (see Early 1983-Late 1984 and Early 1989). [United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001]

Mid-1980s: US Officials Allegedly Meet Directly with Bin Laden

  

Journalist Simon Reeve will claim in the 1999 book The New Jackals that US officials directly met with bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s. He will write, “American emissaries are understood to have traveled to Pakistan for meetings with mujaheddin leaders… [A former CIA official] even suggests the US emissaries met directly with bin Laden, and that it was bin Laden, acting on advice from his friends in Saudi intelligence, who first suggested the mujaheddin should be given Stingers.” [Reeve, 1999, pp. 167, 176] The CIA begins supplying Stinger missiles to the mujaheddin in 1986 (see September 1986). After 9/11, the CIA will state, “Numerous comments in the media recently have reiterated a widely circulated but incorrect notion that the CIA once had a relationship with Osama bin Laden. For the record, you should know that the CIA never employed, paid, or maintained any relationship whatsoever with bin Laden.” [US State Department, 1/14/2005]

Early 1985: Salem Bin Laden Says Brother Osama Is Liaison between US, Afghan Rebels, and Saudi Government

  

Salem bin Laden tells one of his employees, George Harrington, that his brother Osama, is, according to a later account by Harrington, “the liaison between the US, the Saudi government, and the Afghan rebels.” Salem, head of the bin Laden family, also says that he must visit Osama in Peshawar, a base inside Pakistan for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin, to check on what equipment the Saudi government is funneling to him. The two men fly up together with another employee, Bengt Johansson, and meet Osama that day. Osama also gives his brother and the two employees a tour of some facilities in Peshawar, including refugee camps, a hospital and an orphanage, and Salem films them to publicize his brother’s charitable work. [Coll, 2008, pp. 7-9]

Early 1986: CIA Aware of Bin Laden’s Activities in Pakistan; Knows He Is ‘Tapping into’ CIA-Backed Operation

  

The CIA is aware of Osama bin Laden’s operations in Afghanistan by this point, at the latest. The CIA learns that bin Laden has stepped up his support for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin by helping to establish a network of guesthouses along the Afghan frontier, not for local fighters, but for Arabs arriving to help out the Afghans. The network is centered in the border city of Peshawar, where bin Laden is “spreading large sums of money around.” According to author Steve Coll, the CIA also knows that bin Laden is “tapping into” camps run by Pakistan’s ISI intelligence agency and funded by the CIA to train anti-Soviet fighters. Reports of this activity are passed to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. Stanley Bedington, a senior analyst at the center, will later say, “When a man starts throwing around money like that, he comes to your notice.” He will also say that at this time bin Laden was “not a warrior,” and that he was “not engaged in any fighting.” [Coll, 2004, pp. 146]

1986-March 19, 2002: Bin Laden and Chechen Rebel Leader Ibn Khattab Have Ongoing Relationship

  

Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab [Source: Associated Press]

Osama bin Laden and Chechen rebel leader Ibn Khattab are, as a CIA officer puts it, “intricately tied together” in a number of ways. Their relationship apparently begins in the mid-1980s, when Ibn Khattab goes to fight in Afghanistan and reportedly meets bin Laden there. It ends in March 2002 with Khattab’s death (see March 19, 2002). [BBC, 4/26/2002; Independent, 5/1/2002; Washington Post, 4/26/2003; US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, 7/31/2006 ]
They share fundraising and recruiting networks. For example, a Florida cell of radical Sunnis that is monitored by the FBI starting in 1993 is involved with both organizations (see (October 1993-November 2001)). Radical London imam Abu Qatada raises money for jihad in Chechnya (see 1995-February 2001 and February 2001) and is a key figure in al-Qaeda-related terrorism who is in communication with al-Qaeda logistics manager Abu Zubaida. [BBC, 3/23/2004; Nasiri, 2006, pp. 273] The Finsbury Park mosque of fellow London imam Abu Hamza al-Masri is used as a conduit for funds for both jihad in Chechnya and bin Laden’s Darunta camp in Afghanistan (see March 1999 and March 2000-February 2001);
Bin Laden sends hundreds of fighters to help the Chechen cause, and this is publicly revealed no later than August 2000 (see May 2000);
The two leaders debate strategy; [Terrorism Monitor, 1/26/2006] and
Ibn Khattab establishes camps for trainees sent to him by bin Laden, and the US is aware of this no later than October 1998 (see October 16, 1998).
Despite bin Laden’s contribution to the Chechen effort, he does not have control of operations there. [Terrorism Monitor, 1/26/2006] Zacarias Moussaoui will later be linked to Khattab (see August 22, 2001).

(After April 1986): Bin Laden Brothers Negotiate with South Africans to Buy Weapons for Arab Afghans

  

Salem and Osama bin Laden hold a series of meetings with South African arms dealers to discuss supplies for the anti-Soviet mujaheddin in Afghanistan. One meeting is held at the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar, Pakistan, and a person who attends this meeting will later discuss it with a lawyer acting for victims of the 9/11 attacks. The person’s name is not known. The meeting is attended by Osama bin Laden, Afghan commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and two South African officers. The attendees discuss weapons and training. There are other meetings in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, between South African suppliers and Salem bin Laden, Osama’s older brother. Arms purchases are also discussed there. Reportedly, some of the financing for the weapons comes from the Saudi government. [Coll, 2008, pp. 287]

May 1986: Bin Laden Leads Arab Fighters into Afghanistan, but Mission Ends in Failure

  

Osama bin Laden leads a small force of Arab anti-Soviet fighters into Afghanistan to join local forces near the village of Jaji, a few miles from the Pakistan border. The territory where the group sets up is controlled by Afghan warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an associate of bin Laden’s. One night, the Arabs’ tents are pelted by what appears to be debris from a distant explosion, and in the morning the men find that they are surrounded by mines. As they are withdrawing, they are hit by a missile, which lands a few meters from bin Laden, and there is a huge explosion on a nearby mountain. Three men are wounded and one dies. Finally, the local Afghan forces ask them to withdraw, because, in the words of author Lawrence Wright, “they were so useless.” This appears to be the first time bin Laden fires a weapon or is fired upon during the war. [Wright, 2006, pp. 111]

Mid-1986: Osama and Salem Bin Laden Purchase Anti-Aircraft Missiles in London

  

Osama and Salem bin Laden purchase anti-aircraft missiles for Arab volunteers fighting in Afghanistan in a deal concluded at the Dorchester Hotel in London. The transaction results from a request by Osama that Salem help him with two purchases, of the anti-aircraft missiles and of equipment to refill ammunition shells for AK-47 assault rifles.
Middleman - Salem attempted to obtain the missiles from the Pentagon, but was rebuffed (see (Early-Mid 1986)), and brought a German acquaintance named Thomas Dietrich in to help him complete the deal. It is difficult to arrange as, even though the bin Ladens are backed by the Saudi government, they do not have clearance to buy the missiles from Western authorities. Dietrich has contacts at the arms manufacturer Heckler & Koch and also gets an arms salesman to meet Salem and Osama in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. However, the salesman tells Osama that refilling the ammunition makes no sense and it would be simpler to just purchase it on the international market. For the missiles, Osama, Salem, Dietrich and Dietrich’s contacts meet two or three times at the Dorchester Hotel over a period of six to eight weeks. Dietrich will later learn that his contacts help arrange the purchase of Soviet SA-7 missiles in South America, as well as the ammunition.
Paid in Oil - However, there is a problem with the deal because the bin Ladens want to pay for the weapons not with cash, but with oil, “just a tanker offshore,” according to Dietrich. This causes trouble as “a company like Heckler & Koch, they don’t want oil, they want money.” Dietrich is not aware of the source of funding for the purchases, but author Steve Coll will note, “The best available evidence suggests it probably came at least in part from the Saudi government,” because the bin Ladens are “working in concert with official Saudi policy” and “seem to fit inside a larger pattern.” This is a reference to the Al Yamamah arms deal (see Late 1985). [Coll, 2008, pp. 284-288]

Late 1986: Bin Laden Sets Up First Dedicated Arab Camp in Afghanistan

  

Osama bin Laden establishes the first training camp, known as Maasada—the Lion’s Den—especially for Arabs fighting in the Soviet-Afghan War. The camp is near the village of Jaji, close to the Pakistani border in eastern Afghanistan. Previously, the Arabs had been integrated with local Afghan forces, although there have been problems with the language barrier and the Arabs’ readiness for battle, which sometimes meant they were used as cannon fodder. A later account by author Lawrence Wright will say that Bin Laden sees the camp as the “first step toward the creation of an Arab legion that could wage war anywhere.”
The Camp - The equipment at the camp includes a bulldozer, Kalashnikov machine guns, mortars, some small anti-aircraft guns, and Chinese rockets (although there are no rocket launchers for them). Most of the people at the camp are Egyptians associated with Ayman al-Zawahiri, or young Saudis. The camp is only three kilometers from a Soviet base, meaning there is a serious danger it could be attacked and fall.
Opposition from Azzam - However, the camp is opposed by bin Laden’s mentor, Abdullah Azzam, because he wants all the Muslims—both Arabs and Afghans—to work together, not a separate camp for Arabic speakers. In addition, Azzam thinks the camp is expensive and, given the guerrilla style of warfare in Afghanistan, impractical.
Construction Work - Bin Laden soon brings in construction vehicles to make the camp more easily defensible. Using equipment from his family firm, he builds seven hidden man-made caverns overlooking an important supply route from Pakistan. Some of the caves are a hundred yards long and twenty feet high, and serve as shelters, dormitories, hospitals, and arms dumps. [Wright, 2006, pp. 111-114]

(1987): CIA Funds Mujahedeen Leader Who Supports Bin Laden

  

Shortly after 1986, mujahedeen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani becomes a direct asset of the CIA, according to author Steve Coll. The CIA is already supporting other mujahedeen leaders by paying cash to the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, which in turn gives money to the leaders. But Haqqani is a rare case of the CIA working with an Afghan leader without going through the ISI. But at the same time, the ISI also heavily supports and funds Haqqani. At this time, Osama bin Laden and other Arabs fighting in Afghanistan are based in territory controlled by Haqqani, so the CIA support for Haqqani also benefits bin Laden and other radical Islamists fighting with him. Bin Laden will later call Haqqani a “hero” and “one of the foremost leaders of the jihad against the Soviets.” Coll will later write: “Haqqani traveled frequently to Peshawar to meet with a Pakistani and, separately, with an American intelligence officer, and to pick up supplies. Osama would have no reason to know about Haqqani’s opportunistic work with the CIA, but he and his Arab volunteers benefited from it. They stood apart from the CIA’s cash-laden tradecraft—but just barely.” It is not known how long the relationship between the CIA and Haqqani lasts. [Coll, 2008, pp. 285, 294] However, he is so liked by the US that at one point he visits the White House during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. [Associated Press, 12/29/2009] Haqqani will later join the Taliban, and then he will start his own militant group linked to the Taliban known as the Haqqani network. In 2008, the New York Times will report: “Today [Haqqani] has turned his expertise on American and NATO forces. From his base in northwestern Pakistan, [he] has maintained a decades-old association with Osama bin Laden and other Arabs. Together with his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, 34, he and these allies now share a common mission to again drive foreign forces from Afghanistan.” [New York Times, 6/17/2008] Haqqani also will maintain his link to the ISI. In 2008, US intelligence will overhear the head of Pakistan’s military calling Haqqani a “strategic asset” (see May 2008).

Late 1980s: Bin Laden Meets Rebel Supporter in Pakistan

  

Yassin Kadi, a Saudi architect and businessman (see 1981), meets with Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. Both are backers of the Afghan rebels in their war with the Soviet Union. Kadi, who will become a millionaire and a suspected terror supporter, will reveal his contacts with bin Laden in a 2008 interview. [New York Times, 12/12/2008]

April 17, 1987: Bin Laden-Led Assault in Afghan War Is Total Failure

  

Osama bin Laden commands his first company-sized attack in the Soviet-Afghan War, but the assault is an abject failure. Bin Laden has planned for the attack for months in advance and assembled a force of 120 fighters, including ones not usually based at his Maasada camp and jihad leader Abdullah Azzam (see Late 1986). The Arabs are to attack an Afghan government base just before darkness under covering artillery fire provided by two Afghan rebel commanders, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Following a quick strike, the Arabs will then withdraw, using the night to hide from Soviet aircraft. However, the logistics are badly handled: ammunition is not supplied to forward positions, the Arabs forget electrical wire to connect rockets to detonators, and they run out of food. In addition, an Afghan government soldier overhears their preparations and opens fire with a machine gun, pinning them down. The Arabs are forced to withdraw without even having begun their attack, suffering three casualties, including one killed. This incident is a serious blow to their pride, and Pakistani authorities even begin shutting down Arab guest houses at the mujaheddin staging centers in Pakistan. [Wright, 2006, pp. 115-116]

May 1987: Bin Laden-Led Force Holds Out against Soviets at Battle of Lion’s Den, Wins Big Propaganda Victory

  

Soviet forces assault a position held by forces commanded by Osama bin Laden, but are repelled. This is the best-known battle in which bin Laden is involved in Afghanistan, and takes place at Jaji, around bin Laden’s Lion’s Den camp (see Late 1986). The attack may be the result of a small skirmish shortly before in which bin Laden’s Arabs attacked a group of Soviet troops, forcing them to withdraw.
Attack - In the initial assault, the Soviets are repulsed by mortar fire, and the defenders are also successful against the second wave, killing and wounding several enemy soldiers. The Soviets then shell bin Laden’s positions for weeks, but the mujaheddin cannot be dislodged. [Wright, 2006, pp. 115-116] Estimates of the number of troops vary. According to author Steve Coll, there are about 50 Arabs facing 200 Soviet troops, including some from an elite Spetsnaz unit. [Coll, 2004, pp. 162]
Withdrawal - However, bin Laden begins to worry that his men will all be killed if they stay longer. As a result, he forces his men to retreat, although some of them protest and have to be cajoled into doing so. Before pulling out, the camp is destroyed so that the Soviets cannot use it; the canons are pushed into a ravine, the automatic weapons buried, and the pantry grenaded.
Ordered to Return - Bin Laden’s men fall back on a camp run by a leading Afghan commander, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, one of the key mujahidden leaders in the area. However, Sayyaf has come to recognize the Lion’s Den’s strategic value, and is angry they pulled back without his approval. Sayyaf orders the Arabs back and sends about twenty of his own men to make sure they hold their position.
Attacked Again, Victorious - After he returns, bin Laden, who has been ill, is too distraught at the camp’s poor condition and lack of food to give orders, and one of his senior assistants, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, takes over. Bin Laden is sent to guard one of the camp’s flanks, but his small group of men encounters a Soviet advance and comes under heavy mortar fire. Bin Laden will later comment, “It was a terrible battle, which ended up with me half sunk in the ground, firing at anything I could see.” Many accounts will say that at this point bin Laden falls asleep under enemy fire, although, according to author Lawrence Wright, he may actually faint due to low blood pressure. In any event, late in the day al-Banshiri is able to outflank the Soviets and force them to withdraw, securing a great victory for the Arabs.
Significance of Battle - The Lion’s Den is only a small part of a larger engagement mostly fought by the Soviets against Sayyaf’s Afghans, but it is a hugely important propaganda victory for the Arabs. Bin Laden, who is given a Soviet AK-47 by al-Banshiri after the battle, will later comment, “The morale of the mujaheddin soared, not only in our area, but in the whole of Afghanistan.” Wright will later comment that it gives the Arabs “a reputation for courage and recklessness that established their legend, at least among themselves,” and becomes “the foundation of the myth that they defeated the superpower.” [Wright, 2006, pp. 118-120] Coll will add: “Chronicled daily at the time by several Arab journalists who observed the fighting from a mile or two away, the battle of Jaji marked the birth of Osama bin Laden’s public reputation as a warrior among Arab jihadists… After Jaji he began a media campaign designed to publicize the brave fight waged by Arab volunteers who stood their ground against a superpower. In interviews and speeches around Peshawar and back home in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden sought to recruit new fighters to his cause and to chronicle his own role as a military leader.” [Coll, 2004, pp. 163]

August 11-20, 1988: Bin Laden Forms Al-Qaeda

  

The notes from al-Qaeda’s formation meeting. The short lines on the right side are the list of attendees. [Source: CNN]

Bin Laden conducts two meetings to discuss “the establishment of a new military group,” according to notes that are found later. Notes reveal the group is initially called al-Qaeda al-Askariya, which roughly translates to “the military base.” But the name soon shortens to just al-Qaeda, meaning “the base” or “the foundation.” [Associated Press, 2/19/2003; Wright, 2006, pp. 131-134] With the Soviets in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan, it is proposed to create the new group to keep military jihad, or holy war, alive after the Soviets are gone. The notes don’t specify what the group will do exactly, but it concludes, “Initial estimate, within six months of al-Qaeda (founding), 314 brothers will be trained and ready.” In fact, al-Qaeda will remain smaller than that for years to come. Fifteen people attend these two initial meetings. [Wright, 2006, pp. 131-134] In addition to bin Laden, other attendees include:
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the head of the Egyptian militant group Islamic Jihad. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002]
Mohammed Atef, a.k.a. Abu Hafs.
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a.k.a. Abu Hajer.
Jamal al-Fadl.
Wael Hamza Julaidan.
Mohammed Loay Bayazid, a US citizen, who is notetaker for the meetings. [Wright, 2006, pp. 131-134]
Al-Fadl will reveal details about the meetings to US investigators in 1996 (see June 1996-April 1997). Notes to the meeting will be found in Bosnia in early 2002. [New Yorker, 9/9/2002] It will take US intelligence years even to realize a group named al-Qaeda exists; the first known incidence of US intelligence being told the name will come in 1993 (see May 1993).

Spring 1989: ISI and Bin Laden Allegedly Plot to Kill Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

  

Hamid Gul, Nawaz Sharif, and Osama bin Laden conspire to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Husein Haqqani, a Pakistani journalist who claims to have been involved in the plot, will later say that ISI Director Hamid Gul contacted Osama bin Laden, who was then known to provide financial support to Afghan mujaheddin, to pay for a coup/assassination of Bhutto. Gul also brings Nawaz Sharif, then the governor of Punjab province and a rival of Bhutto, into the plot. Bin Laden agrees to provide $10 million on the condition that Sharif transforms Pakistan into a strict Islamic state, which Sharif accepts. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 193-194] Bhutto is not assassinated at this time, but bin Laden allegedly helps Sharif replace Bhutto one year later (see October 1990).

November 24, 1989: Bin Laden’s Mentor Assassinated

  

Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. [Source: CNN]

Bin Laden’s mentor Sheikh Abdullah Azzam is killed by a car bomb in Afghanistan. The killing is never solved. Azzam has no shortage of enemies. Suspects include the Mossad, CIA, Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the ISI, and bin Laden. The reason bin Laden is suspected is because he and Azzam were increasingly at odds over what approach to take since the Soviet Union had been driven from Afghanistan earlier in the year (see February 15, 1989). [Slate, 4/16/2002; Coll, 2004, pp. 204] In 1998, Mohammed Saddiq Odeh will be arrested and later convicted for a role in the 1998 African embassy bombings. He reportedly will tell US interrogators that bin Laden “personally ordered the killing of Azzam because he suspected his former mentor had ties with the CIA.” However, it is not known if Odeh was just passing on a rumor. [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 32] Regardless, in the wake of Azzam’s death, bin Laden takes control of Azzam’s recruiting and support network, Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK)/Al-Kifah, and merges it with al-Qaeda, which was formed the year before (see August 11-20, 1988). [Slate, 4/16/2002; Coll, 2004, pp. 204]

Late 1989-Late 1991: Bin Laden Slowly Shifts Operations to Sudan, Keeps Training Camps in Afghanistan

  

Hassan al-Turabi comes to power in Sudan in 1989, and his beliefs are ideologically compatible with bin Laden’s. With the Afghan war ending and the Afghans beginning to fight amongst themselves, al-Turabi sends a delegation and a letter to bin Laden, inviting him to collaborate and move to Sudan. Bin Laden agrees to the offer, but moves slowly. He sends advance teams to buy businesses and houses. He also visits Sudan himself to establish a relationship with al-Turabi. Gradually, about 1,000 bin Laden supporters move to Sudan. But bin Laden also keeps offices and guest houses in Pakistan, as well as training camps in Afghanistan, including the Darunta, Jihad Wal, Khaldan, Sadeek, Al Farooq, and Khalid ibn Walid camps. US-al-Qaeda double agent Ali Mohamed plays an important role in the move (see Summer 1991). [Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 39-41]

Early 1990s-Late 1996: Bin Laden Frequently Travels to London, According to Various Sources

  

The 1999 book The New Jackals by journalist Simon Reeve will report that in the early 1990s, bin Laden “was flitting between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, London, and Sudan.” Reeve does not say who his sources are for this statement. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 156]
Bin Laden had concluded an arms deal to purchase ground-to-air missiles for anti-Soviet fighters at the Dorchester Hotel in Central London in 1986 (see Mid-1986).
Bin Laden allegedly visits the London mansion of Saudi billionaire Khalid bin Mahfouz around 1991 (see (1991)).
Bin Laden allegedly travels to London and Manchester to meet GIA militants in 1994 (see 1994).
One report claims bin Laden briefly lived in London in 1994 (see Early 1994).
Similarly, the 1999 book Dollars for Terror by Richard Labeviere will claim, “According to several authorized sources, Osama bin Laden traveled many times to the British capital between 1995 and 1996, on his private jet.”
The book will also point out that in February 1996, bin Laden was interviewed for the Arabic weekly al-Watan al-Arabi and the interview was held in the London house of Khalid al-Fawwaz, bin Laden’s de facto press secretary at the time (see Early 1994-September 23, 1998). [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 101]
An interview with bin Laden will be published in the Egyptian weekly Rose Al Yusuf on June 17, 1996. The interview is said to have been conducted in London, but the exact date of the interview is not known. [Emerson, 2006, pp. 423]
In a book first published in 1999, journalist John Cooley will say that bin Laden “seems to have avoided even clandestine trips [to London] from 1995.” [Cooley, 2002, pp. 63]
Labeviere, however, will claim bin Laden was in London as late as the second half of 1996, and, “according to several Arab diplomatic sources, this trip was clearly under the protection of the British authorities.” [Labeviere, 1999, pp. 108]
After 9/11, some will report that bin Laden never traveled to any Western countries in his life. On the other hand, in 2005 a British cabinet official will state that in late 1995 bin Laden actually considered moving to London (see Late 1995).

August 2, 1990-March 1991: Bin Laden and Saudi Government Clash Over First Gulf War

  

After Iraq invades Kuwait (see November 8, 1990), bin Laden, newly returned to Saudi Arabia, offers the Saudi government the use of his thousands of veteran fighters from the Afghan war to defend the country in case Iraq attacks it. The Saudi government turns him down, allowing 300,000 US soldiers on Saudi soil instead. Bin Laden is incensed, and immediately goes from ally to enemy of the Saudis. [Coll, 2004, pp. 221-24, 270-71] After a slow buildup, the US invades Iraq in March 1991 and reestablishes Kuwait. [Posner, 2003, pp. 40-41] Bin Laden soon leaves Saudi Arabia and soon forms al-Qaeda ((see Summer 1991)).

October 1990: Bin Laden Allegedly Helps Install Pakistani Leader Nawaz Sharif

  

In October 1990, Nawaz Sharif is running for election to replace Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister of Pakistan. According to a senior Pakistani intelligence source, bin Laden passes a considerable amount of money to Sharif and his party, since Sharif promises to introduce a hard-line Islamic government. Bin Laden has been supporting Sharif for several years. There is said to be a photograph of Sharif chatting with bin Laden. Sharif wins the election and while he does not introduce a hard-line Islamic government, his rule is more amenable to bin Laden’s interests than Bhutto’s had been. Sharif will stay in power until 1993, then will take over from Bhutto again in 1996 and rule for three more years. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 170-171] Former ISI official Khalid Khawaja, a self-proclaimed close friend of bin Laden, will later claim that Sharif and bin Laden had a relationship going back to when they first met face to face in the late 1980s. [ABC News, 11/30/2007] There are also accounts of additional links between Sharif and bin Laden (see Spring 1989, Late 1996, and Between Late 1996 and Late 1998).

(1991): Bin Laden Allegedly Stays at London Estate of Saudi Billionaire

  

Khalid bin Mahfouz. [Source: CBC]

Shortly after 9/11, the London Times will report that Osama bin Laden stayed at the London estate of Saudi billionaire Khalid bin Mahfouz. “Sources close to the bin Mahfouz family say that about 10 years ago, when bin Laden was widely regarded as a religious visionary and defender of the Muslim faith, he visited the property and spent ‘two or three days’ on the estate, relaxing in its open-air swimming pool, walking in the grounds and talking to bin Mahfouz. What the men discussed remains a mystery.” Bin Mahfouz was a major investor in the criminal Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which is closed down around this time (see July 5, 1991). [London Times, 9/23/2001] Bin Laden was also heavily invested in BCCI at the time (see July 1991). There are other reports of bin Laden visiting London around this time (see Early 1990s-Late 1996), and even briefly living there (see Early 1994). The name “bin Mahfouz” appears on the “Golden Chain,” a list of early al-Qaeda financial supporters (see 1988-1989). Bin Mahfouz denies any terrorist link to bin Laden.

Summer 1991: Bin Laden Leaves Saudi Arabia

  

Bin Laden, recently returned to Saudi Arabia, has been placed under house arrest for his opposition to the continued presence of US soldiers on Saudi soil. [PBS Frontline, 2001] Controversial author Gerald Posner claims that a classified US intelligence report describes a secret deal between bin Laden and Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki al-Faisal at this time. Although bin Laden has become an enemy of the Saudi state, he is nonetheless too popular for his role with the mujaheddin in Afghanistan to be easily imprisoned or killed. According to Posner, bin Laden is allowed to leave Saudi Arabia with his money and supporters, but the Saudi government will publicly disown him. Privately, the Saudis will continue to fund his supporters with the understanding that they will never be used against Saudi Arabia. The wrath of the fundamentalist movement is thus directed away from the vulnerable Saudis. [Posner, 2003, pp. 40-42] Posner alleges the Saudis “effectively had [bin Laden] on their payroll since the start of the decade.” [Time, 8/31/2003] This deal is reaffirmed in 1996 and 1998. Bin Laden leaves Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1991, returning first to Afghanistan. [Coll, 2004, pp. 229-31, 601-02] After staying there a few months, he moves again, settling into Sudan with hundreds of ex-mujaheddin supporters (see 1992-1996). [PBS Frontline, 2001]

July 1991: Bin Laden Loses Money in BCCI; Begins Profiting from Drug Trade

  

BCCI logo. [Source: BCCI]

In early 2001, anonymous US officials will say that when the notorious Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is shut down in July 1991 (see July 5, 1991), Osama bin Laden suffers a heavy blow because he has put much of his money in the bank and he loses everything he invested there. As a result, he begins to launder money from the drug trade to make up for the lost revenue. He cooperates with Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is already diverting profits from the Afghan drug trade to help finance Islamic terrorist movements. Others claim bin Laden begins his involvement with the drug trade several years later. [United Press International, 3/1/2001] It also seems that bin Laden’s financial network eventually grows to at least partly replace the role of BCCI for Islamist militant financing (see After July 1991).

After July 1991: Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, and Muslim Brotherhood Benefit from Collapse of BCCI, Form New Financial Network to Replace It

  

In July 1991, the criminal BCCI bank is shut down (see July 5, 1991), and Osama bin Laden apparently loses some of his fortune held in BCCI accounts as a result (see July 1991). But while bin Laden loses money, he and his future second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri gain influence. Other Islamist militants have been heavily relying on BCCI for their finances, and in the wake of BCCI’s collapse they are forced to bank elsewhere. Author Roland Jacquard will later claim that “following [the bank’s closure], funds [are] transferred from BCCI to banks in Dubai, Jordan, and Sudan controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of the money [is] handed back to organizations such as the FIS [a political party in Algeria]. Another portion [is] transferred by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Switzerland, the Netherlands, London, Antwerp, and Malaysia.” [Jacquard, 2002, pp. 129] Author Adam Robinson will come to similar conclusions, noting that when BCCI collapses bin Laden has just moved to Sudan, which is ruled by Hassan al-Turabi, who has similar Islamist views to bin Laden. Robinson writes, “Without a system by which money could be transferred around the world invisibly, it would be relatively simple for terrorist funds to be traced. Dealing with this crisis fell to al-Turabi. In desperation he turned to Osama.… The future of the struggle could come to rest on Osama’s shoulders.” Over the next several months, bin Laden and a small team of financial experts work on a plan to replace the functions of BCCI. Bin Laden already knows many of the main Islamist backers from his experience in the Afghan war. “During the summer of 1991 he discreetly made contact with many of the wealthiest of these individuals, especially those with an international network of companies.… Within months, Osama unveiled before an astonished al-Turabi what he called ‘the Brotherhood Group.’” This is apparently a reference to the Muslim Brotherhood. Robinson says this group is made up of 134 Arab businessmen with a collective wealth of many billions of dollars. The network will effectively replace BCCI for Islamist militants. [Robinson, 2001, pp. 138-139] A French report shortly after 9/11 will confirm that bin Laden’s network largely replaces BCCI (see October 10, 2001). Right around this time, bin Laden is seen at the London estate of Khalid bin Mahfouz, one of the major investors in BCCI (see (1991)).

Between August 1992 and 1993: Bin Laden Sends Quarter of Million Dollars to US; CIA Is Monitoring His Banking Operations

  

Osama bin Laden sends about $250,000 to an associate named Essam al Ridi in the US. The money is moved in more than one transfer from the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Sudan and is for the purchase of a plane by al Ridi for bin Laden (see Early 1993). The CIA has been monitoring bin Laden’s banking operations for some time (see 1991-1992). Al Ridi will be asked about this transfer at the US trial of al-Qaeda operatives involved in the 1998 embassy bombings, where he is a witness for the prosecution. Under cross examination, he will say that he was not concerned about such large transfers from Sudan to Texas because receiving such monies was not a problem for him in the US, although it might have been a problem for him if he was still in Egypt. [United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1/14/2001] Al Ridi previously purchased assassination rifles for the anti-Soviet Afghan Arabs, apparently with the CIA’s knowledge (see Early 1989).

Shortly After December 29, 1992: US Announces Withdrawal from Yemen following Bombings, Bin Laden Later Claims Victory

  

Following attacks on two hotels near where US troops stayed (see December 29, 1992), the US announces it will no longer use Yemen as a base to support operations in Somalia. [Bergen, 2001, pp. 176] Although no US troops are killed, the attacks are regarded as a success by militant Islamists. In 1998, Osama bin Laden will say, “The United States wanted to set up a military base for US soldiers in Yemen, so that it could send fresh troops to Somalia… The Arab mujaheddin related to the Afghan jihad carried out two bomb explosions in Yemen to warn the United States, causing damage to some Americans staying in those hotels. The United States received our warning and gave up the idea of setting up its military bases in Yemen. This was the first al-Qaeda victory scored against the Crusaders.” [Scheuer, 2006, pp. 147]

1993: CIA Declares Bin Laden Significant Financial Backer of Islamic Militants

  

In 2007, former CIA Director George Tenet will write, “As early as 1993, [the CIA] had declared bin Laden to be a significant financier backer of Islamic terrorist movements. We knew he was funding paramilitary training of Arab religious militants in such far-flung places as Bosnia, Egypt, Kashmir, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Yemen” (see July-August 1993). [Tenet, 2007, pp. 100]

October 3-4, 1993: Al-Qaeda Trained Militants in Somalia Kill 18 US Soldiers

  

A UN vehicle burning in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3, 1993. [Source: CNN]

Eighteen US soldiers are killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, in a spontaneous gun battle following an attempt by US Army Rangers and Delta Force to snatch two assistants of a local warlord; the event later becomes the subject of the movie Black Hawk Down. A 1998 US indictment will charge Osama bin Laden and his followers with training the attackers. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/2002]
Rocket Propelled Grenades - While rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are not usually effective against helicopters, the fuses on the RPGs fired by the Somalis against US helicopters are modified so that they explode in midair. During the Soviet-Afghan War, bin Laden associates had learned from the US and British that, although it is hard to score a direct hit on a helicopter’s weak point—its tail rotor—a grenade on an adjusted fuse exploding in midair can spray a tail rotor with shrapnel, causing a helicopter to crash. [Los Angeles Times, 2/25/2002]
Possibly Trained by Al-Qaeda - For months, many al-Qaeda operatives had been traveling to Somalia and training militants in an effort to oppose the presence of US soldiers there. Even high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders like Mohammed Atef were directly involved (see Late 1992-October 1993).
Comment by Bin Laden - In a March 1997 interview, bin Laden will say of the Somalia attack, “With Allah’s grace, Muslims over there cooperated with some Arab mujaheddin who were in Afghanistan… against the American occupation troops and killed large numbers of them.” [CNN, 4/20/2001]
Some Al-Qaeda Operatives Leave Somalia after Battle - Al-Qaeda operative L’Houssaine Kherchtou, who supports the organization’s operations in Somalia, will later say that he was told this event also led at least some al-Qaeda members to flee Somalia. “They told me that they were in a house in Mogadishu and one of the nights one of the helicopters were shot, they heard some shooting in the next house where they were living, and they were scared, and the next day they left because they were afraid that they will be caught by the Americans.” [Bergen, 2006, pp. 141]

December 6, 1993: Bin Laden Gives First Interview to a Western Journalist

  

The British newspaper The Independent publishes the first interview of Osama bin Laden in Western countries. Veteran journalist Robert Fisk interviews bin Laden in Sudan, where bin Laden is ostensibly living a peaceful life. Fisk does note that the “Western embassy circuit in Khartoum has suggested that some of the ‘Afghans’ whom this Saudi entrepreneur flew to Sudan are now busy training for further jihad wars in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt,” but generally bin Laden is portrayed as a former mujaheddin fighter turned peaceful businessman. This is reflected in the title of the article: “Anti-Soviet Warrior Puts His Army on the Road to Peace.” Bin Laden talks some about his role in the Soviet-Afghan war, boasting that he helped thousands of mujaheddin go there to fight. Fisk comments, “When the history of the Afghan resistance movement is written, Mr. bin Laden’s own contribution to the mujaheddin - and the indirect result of his training and assistance - may turn out to be a turning-point in the recent history of militant fundamentalism…” Fisk tells bin Laden that his name has recently been mentioned by Muslim fighters in Bosnia. Bin Laden acknowledges his influence there, but complains about how difficult it is for fighters to cross into Bosnia. [Independent, 12/6/1993]

1994: Bin Laden Travels to Britain to Meet Algerian Militants

  

According to a book by French counterterrorism expert Roland Jacquard first published just prior to 9/11, “Bin Laden himself traveled to Manchester and the London suburb of Wembley in 1994 to meet associates of the GIA, notably those producing the Al Ansar newsletter. Financed by a bin Laden intermediary, this newsletter called for a jihad against France in 1995, the opening salvo of which was the Saint-Michel metro attack.” [Jacquard, 2002, pp. 67] The GIA is an Algerian militant group heavily infiltrated by government moles around this time (see October 27, 1994-July 16, 1996), and the wave of attacks against France have been called false flag attacks designed to discredit Muslim opponents to the government of Algeria (see January 13,1995 and July-October 1995). It is unknown if bin Laden is duped by the GIA, but in 1996 he will withdraw support from the group, claiming it has been infiltrated by spies (see Mid-1996). Bin Laden appears to make many trips to London in the early 1990s (see Early 1990s-Late 1996). If Jacquard is correct, it seems probable that bin Laden meets with Rachid Ramda at this time, because he is editor-in-chief of Al Ansar and also allegedly finances the GIA attacks in France. Bin Laden will later be accused of funding the attacks through Ramda (see January 5, 1996). [Jacquard, 2002, pp. 64]

1994: Bin Laden Front Establishes Secure Communications through Denver Using US Army Lines

  

The London-based Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC) establishes a secure system for communications between Saudi Arabia and London for Osama bin Laden. The system is set up by Denver resident Lujain al-Imam, wife of London-based Islamic activist Mohammad al-Massari, at his request. The calls are routed from Saudi Arabia to Britain through Denver, Colorado, using toll-free lines established for US servicemen during the Gulf War, in order to stop the Saudi government from intercepting the messages. After the system is set up, bin Laden calls al-Massari to thank him. It is not known how long the phone system is used. However, in late 2001 al-Imam will say that some of the people involved in setting up the system are still in the Denver area, but she will not name them. [Scripps Howard News Service, 11/12/2001]
Who Else Is in Denver? - The ARC is widely considered bin Laden’s publicity office. ARC head Khalid al-Fawwaz will be indicted for his involvement in the US embassy bombings in 1998 (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998 and August 21, 2001). Denver-based radical publisher Homaidan al-Turki begins to be investigated over suspicions he is involved in terrorism in 1995, although it is unclear whether this is related to the Saudi Arabia-Britain phone lines. [Associated Press, 8/31/2006] Another likely suspect for this communications hub would be Ziyad Khaleel. He lives in Denver in the early 1990s until about 1994, and is vice president of the Denver Islamic Society. In 1998, he will work with al-Fawwaz to buy a satellite phone for bin Laden (see November 1996-Late August 1998). [Denver Post, 1/27/1991; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1/22/2003] It seems likely Khaleel is in contact with Anwar al-Awlaki at this time, since al-Awlaki works as an imam for the Denver Islamic Society from 1994 to 1996. In 1999, al-Awlaki will be investigated by the FBI for his links to Khaleel (see June 1999-March 2000). He will go on to be the imam for a couple of the future 9/11 hijackers in San Diego, California, and then will become a prominent radical in Yemen. [New York Times, 5/8/2010]

Early 1994: Bin Laden Allegedly Briefly Lives in London

  

Shortly after 9/11, unnamed FBI agents will tell a British newspaper that bin Laden stayed in London for several months in 1994. He was already wanted by the US, but “confusion at British intelligence agencies allowed him to slip away.” However, it may not simply have been confusion as British intelligence has a history of not acting on radical Muslim militants in Britain. One Israeli intelligence source will tell the same newspaper, “We know they come and go as they like in Britain. In the past our government has remonstrated with the Home Office but nothing has happened.” [Daily Express, 9/16/2001] A US Congressional Research Service report completed shortly before 9/11 will similarly conclude that bin Laden visited London in 1994. He lived for a few months in Wembley establishing his de facto press office called the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC), headed by Khalid al-Fawwaz (see Early 1994-September 23, 1998). [Guardian, 9/14/2001] The book Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist by Adam Robinson will also state that bin Laden visits London for three months in early 1994, buying a house near Harrow Road in Wembley through an intermediary. The house will continued to be used by ARC long after he leaves. Bin Laden even attends a football (soccer) game at Arsenal. [Robinson, 2001, pp. 167-168; BBC, 11/11/2001] There are reports that bin Laden visits Britain at other times (see Early 1990s-Late 1996) and even considers applying for political asylum there in 1995 (see Late 1995). Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, is also “said to have lived in Britain for a time after fleeing Cairo, [Egypt, in the 1980s,] but [British ministers] refused Egypt’s request to arrest and extradite him.” [London Times, 9/24/2001]

March 1994: US Withdraws from Somalia Following ‘Black Hawk Down’ Incident, Bin Laden Later Claims Victory

  

The US withdraws from Somalia six months after the Battle of Mogadishu, during which 18 US soldiers were killed and four Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by local clan fighters (see October 3-4, 1993). The casualties caused the battle to be regarded as a pyrrhic victory in the US, even though the US force had actually captured two lieutenants of a local clan leader and killed hundreds of Somalis. [Bowden, 1999, pp. 448-53] Osama bin Laden, some of whose associates are said to have trained local fighters before the battle, will later claim victory: “The youth [local fighters] were surprised at the low morale of the American soldiers and realized more than before that the American soldier was a paper tiger and [would] after a few blows run in defeat. And America forgot all the hoopla and media propaganda… about being the world leader and the leader of the New World Order, and after a few blows they forgot about this title and left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.” In August 1997 he will comment: “The Americans are cowards and cannot confront me. If they ever think of confronting me, I will teach them a lesson similar to the lesson they were taught a few years ago in Somalia.” [Scheuer, 2006, pp. 149]

April 9, 1994: Saudi Government Publicly Breaks with Bin Laden

  

The Saudi government revokes bin Laden’s citizenship and moves to freeze his assets in Saudi Arabia because of his support for Muslim fundamentalist movements. [New York Times, 4/10/1994; PBS Frontline, 2001] However, allegedly, this is only a public front and they privately continue to support him as part of a secret deal allegedly made in 1991 (see Summer 1991). In fact, bin Laden will travel to Albania as part of an official Saudi delegation later in the month (see Shortly After April 9, 1994). The Saudis were said to have been pressured into this move after US officials privately met with Saudi officials and confronted them with satellite images of al-Qaeda training camps in northern Sudan. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 6/6/2005] But Alain Chouet, head of the French intelligence subdivision tracking terrorist movements, will later claim that bin Laden’s “loss of Saudi nationality is nothing but a farce.” [Le Monde (Paris), 4/15/2007]

Shortly After April 9, 1994: Bin Laden Travels to Albania, Meets with Government Officials

  

Bin Laden visits Albania as a member of a Saudi government delegation. He is introduced as a friend of the Saudi government who could finance humanitarian projects. Yet, earlier the same month, the Saudi government supposedly cut all ties with bin Laden (see April 9, 1994). One former US intelligence officer will complain in 1999, “Why was he a member of that delegation? The Saudis are supposed to be our allies. They told us he was persona non grata, and yet here he was working the crowds on an official visit.” Bin Laden strengthens ties with the Albanian secret service, with an eye to assisting the fight against Serbia in the neighboring country of Bosnia. [Reeve, 1999, pp. 180-181; Washington Times, 9/18/2001; Ottawa Citizen, 12/15/2001]

May 21-July 7, 1994: North Yemen, Backed by US and Bin Laden, Wins Yemen Civil War

  

The southern part of Yemen attempts to cede from the rest of the country, but loses the ensuing war and north Yemeni forces take the south’s capital, Aden, reuniting the country. Yemen first united in 1990, but tensions between the two former independent halves of the country resulted in the civil war. As the south is regarded as communist, the north is backed by both the US and Osama bin Laden. [Guardian, 5/6/1994; CounterPunch, 5/20/2002; Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002; Terrorism Monitor, 4/8/2004] The New York Times will say that the north Yemeni president uses “large numbers of Arab Afghans formed into Islamic terrorist units as his shock troops.” [New York Times, 11/26/2000] CIA officer Michael Scheuer will comment, “In 1993 and 1994, bin Laden sent al-Qaeda fighters from Pakistan to Afghanistan—via Sudan—to fight the Yemeni Communists in the civil war that yielded a reunified Yemen.” [Scheuer, 2006, pp. 151] According to Western intelligence, before the war Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a brother of north Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah Saleh, received US$ 20 million from bin Laden to help settle Arab Afghan fighters in the country. When war breaks out, as military commander he deploys these fighters in the war’s final battle for the south’s capital of Aden. Despite its socialist tendencies, the south is backed by Saudi Arabia, as it thinks a divided Yemen is less of a threat to it. [CounterPunch, 5/20/2002; Wall Street Journal, 12/20/2002; Terrorism Monitor, 4/8/2004] Veteran Middle Eastern journalist Brian Whittaker will comment, “The Saudis invested hugely in the war on behalf of the South, and the outcome is a defeat for them as much as anyone.” [Middle East International, 7/22/1994] After the war, the government will allow the radical fighters to settle in Yemen and use it as a base (see After July 1994).